As soon as the G7 ended and the goals were set, the global mining landscape suddenly became tense again.
Is it really that easy to get rid of China’s critical supplies of rare earths, tungsten, etc.?
The calculations of various countries are exposed and manufacturers take frequent actions. What problems are hidden behind the supply chain?
In the past ten years, when the world was upgrading new energy, electronics, and military industries, it quietly handed over the production of basic raw materials and high-end smelting to China.
By 2024, the G7 directly issued a declaration, requiring that by 2030, dependence on any country’s key minerals should be reduced to less than 60%, and even more ruthlessly, it should be closer to 50%.
Everyone understands that this is not a random slogan, but a real calculation of numbers, in order to prevent the West from being restricted by China’s exports of rare earths, permanent magnets, etc.
Policy statements are soaring, and supporting mechanisms are coming quickly.
New alliances, strategic reserves, recycling, the G7 have launched emergency coordination plans.
As a result, under this storm, China’s export control system has been upgraded step by step.
Not only are rules set at the legal level, and exports related to military purposes are strictly controlled, even the military channels for exporting high-end tungsten products to Japan will be cut off directly in 2026.
It may seem like a diplomatic confrontation, but in fact every tightening of mineral exports profoundly shakes up the manufacturing ecosystem.
China is not only a major ore player, but also the person in charge of the refining and smelting process, which has the highest technical threshold.
Minerals such as rare earths and tungsten undergo high-end processing in China and then flow to Western new energy vehicles, wind power, military industry, and electronic assembly lines.
The G7 wants to “de-reliance”, but this link gap cannot be filled by setting up a group at a meeting.
For example, the supply of chips was cut off in the last round, but the purchase of chips was not allowed. The manufacturer could switch supply sources to replace them.
Once rare earth, tungsten, and high-end smelting are restricted, even basic materials cannot be guaranteed, and terminal innovation is directly stuck at the threshold of raw materials.
Why is the G7 so anxious to put up numbers?
After all, everyone is afraid of being “stuck” at critical moments.
If the policy is delayed one day, the strategic reserves will become more uncertain.
Taking minerals such as lithium and nickel as examples, the West is busy piloting full-process tracking, recycling, and subsidies for new production capacity, but actual operations are very slow.
“The mining of new mines is slow, environmental audits are strict, and there are few capable technicians.” It is hard to figure out how much capital needs to be invested to make up for the lost ground.
In addition, the alliance is not yet monolithic.
The United States prioritizes supply chain security, France and Germany care about costs, and Japan and Australia are keen on bilateral agreements.
Everyone wants to get some benefits into it, but no one is willing to pay for the “allies”.
China has simply adopted export control, which has become the norm and is closely linked to national security, interests and military purposes.
Every time a policy is implemented, global industries immediately have a clear impact.
In 2026, tungsten exports to Japan will be cut off, and the Japanese manufacturing industry will have to adjust prices and reduce production on an emergency basis.
This round, recycling, premium purchasing, and inventory digestion have become habitual responses, but they can only last for a while.
China’s exports were adjusted in accordance with the law, global prices immediately fluctuated, and pressure on downstream manufacturers’ manufacturing costs and supply chain stability surged.
Many companies believe that hoarding goods and desperately recycling can save the day.
In fact, the “backup solutions” are quite narrow.
Once China’s export policy changes, market terminals will almost immediately follow price increases, order reductions, and rush to buy goods at high prices. Every link is passed on to terminal manufacturers.
“Innovation stops at the door of raw materials”, this sentence is not an exaggeration at all when used today.
Many people believe that dependence can be solved by investing in local mining plants.
In fact, China’s high-end separation, green smelting technology and overall upstream and downstream efficiency accumulated over decades are the barriers.
For example, the European Union interviewed many senior officials at the end of last year. They were confident that they were not against anyone, but they were afraid of being “stuck” unprepared.
Manufacturers from various countries wanted to fix loopholes, but found that if they really wanted to replace China’s smelting capabilities and cost advantages, the money and time spent would be incalculable.
There is another example worth mentioning in passing.
In the early years, South America tried to develop local lithium ore production, but was stuck in environmental protection approval, production capacity support, and technical shortages from mining to smelting.
As a result, the project was delayed for several years and could only be supplemented by imports.
Looking at Australia on the other hand, although it has a large amount of mineral resources, its technology and industrial chain depth are insufficient. Key ores still have to be transported to China for refining and then exported.
Such a reverse sample shows that the presence of ore alone does not mean that the supply chain is independent. Without technology and policy support, end products are still inseparable from China.
Everyone is shouting “risk reduction”, but if the global supply chain wants to be “shuffled”, it will not be done in two or three years.
High-value scattered metals such as rare earths, tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium are behind China’s high threshold technology and mass production capabilities.
The goal set by the G7 alliance is just to collectively accelerate self-rescue.
They say they want to be independent, but in fact they still have more “anxiety resonance” than actual progress.
There is also a voice in the industry that feels that no matter how hard we work on strategic reserves and recycling, it will be difficult to fundamentally eliminate the anxiety about China’s exports.
Global manufacturers are swinging between raw materials, supply chains, and technology upgrades. The result is rising prices, slow innovation, and longer delivery cycles.
The real test is to see who can bear higher costs and who has stronger ability to withstand pressure, and the rules will favor him.
China’s adjustment of exports this time is not just a tough move, but also a proactive “pricing power” for the industry’s voice.
Anyone who wants to buy minerals must negotiate the conditions and can no longer let others decide the policy. This is already a reality.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on June 18 that it “maintains the stability of the global industrial chain.” It has a clear attitude, is legal and compliant, and opposes small circles.
The supply chain game is far from over.
The path G7 can choose is very clear.
On the one hand, the alliance continues to help itself, slowly improves subsidies and policies, accepts structural price increases, and accelerates the reshaping of the industrial chain, but this is time-consuming and costly.
The other side is to maintain high-level cooperation with China. Only when its own capabilities are sufficient can it be truly independent.
Either way, it takes time and money.
Between now and 2030, the global manufacturing industry will inevitably experience a round of price increases and will not be as fast in innovation and supply as in the past.
Every mineral policy adjustment promotes international cooperation and industrial selection.
Looking carefully, we will have to deal with the supply “guardrails” of downstream sectors such as MO, gallium, and new nanomaterials in the future.
In the end, the pressure still falls on ordinary consumers, who have to pay for the increase in raw material prices.
This key mineral game has pushed the manufacturing industry into a new cycle of “lose-lose costs and policies”.
China made precise moves and the G7 alliance saved itself. No one can say how this game will end.
In the short term, it depends on who can stabilize supply and prices. In the long term, it depends on the deepening of technology and industrial chain.
Global manufacturing has been rewritten, and the game continues.
