From the perspective of export data, China’s foreign trade currently presents a situation of “ice and fire”: on one side, exports of electric vehicles, lithium batteries, integrated circuits and other products are often growing by tens of percent or even doubling; on the other side, exports of some traditional consumer goods are slowing down.
Behind this differentiation is the selective and focused tilting of policy resources.
To see clearly which industries are receiving “key support”, we need to go beyond a single data list and look at the differences in the “policy climate” they face from the perspective of several key industries, and how these policies have shaped today’s export landscape.
From the perspective of “three new things”: the policy has shifted from “supporting the horse” to “giving a ride”, and the core is “weaning” to promote upgrading
The “three new things” represented by new energy vehicles, photovoltaics, and lithium batteries are the most dazzling stars in exports at present.
But it is worth noting that the way policies support them is undergoing profound changes. The key word is “from direct subsidies to market dominance.”
The most typical signal is the complete cancellation of photovoltaic export tax rebates.
Starting from April 1, 2026, the export value-added tax rebate (original 9%) for photovoltaic products such as silicon wafers, cells, and modules will be officially reset to zero.
This is regarded by the industry as the end of the photovoltaic “subsidy era”.
The policy logic is very clear: China’s photovoltaic industry has established absolute cost and technology advantages in the world. If it continues to provide tax rebates, it may encourage “involution” low-price competition among enterprises and hand over profits to others.
Canceling tax rebates will cause pain in the short term (corporate costs will rise directly by about 9%), but in the long term it will force companies to abandon price wars and turn to technological innovation and overseas localized production.
Lithium battery and new energy vehicle policies also follow similar logic.
The export tax rebate rate for lithium batteries will be reduced to 6% from April to December 2026, and will be completely canceled starting in 2027.
The purchase tax preference for new energy vehicles will also be adjusted from “full exemption” to “halved tax” from 2026.
These adjustments send a clear signal: the policy no longer pays for simple “scale expansion” and “going overseas at low prices”, but encourages companies to compete in the international market with real technological and management advantages.
How is the effect?
Judging from the data, the “export-rushing” effect of policy adjustments and the strong resilience of the industry are simultaneously apparent.
In the first four months of 2026, my country’s electric vehicle exports increased by 68.1% year-on-year, and lithium battery exports increased by 43.2%.
In March before the tax rebate was cancelled, photovoltaic exports reached a pulse-like peak of 31.9GW in a single month, a month-on-month surge of 96.4%.
In the long term, leading companies such as Longi and Jinko have increased their export prices to Japan, with a maximum increase of 30%, while companies lacking core technologies are facing pressure to liquidate.
Policies are accelerating the reshuffle of the industry and promoting the “three new things” to move up the value chain from “Made in China” to “Intelligent Made in China”.
From the perspective of trade in services: The policy is to “build the foundation” and “open the way”, and the core is to make up for shortcomings and pursue the long term
Unlike the “Three New Things” that are facing policy “weaning”, producer services and knowledge-intensive service trade have received almost all-round “encouragement and support.”
The core contradiction from the policy perspective is that we have a huge “Made in China” system, but the “Chinese Service” capability to provide high-end services is relatively weak.
The policy is therefore “constructive”.
In April 2026, the Ministry of Commerce and other departments jointly issued the “Overall Plan for the Construction of the National Service Trade Innovation Development Demonstration Zone”. The core task is to expand the export of producer services such as R&D and design, biopharmaceutical research and development, integrated circuit full industry chain services, and intelligent networked vehicle full industry chain services.
At the same time, promote digital trade reform and innovation and support the development of “cross-border e-commerce + industrial belt”.
At the local level, places like Liaoning provide interest discounts on loans to cross-border e-commerce companies and subsidize the construction of overseas warehouses based on area.
These policies target our shortcomings.
Data show that from January to February 2026, my country’s knowledge-intensive service exports amounted to 248.23 billion yuan. Although it increased by 2.4%, its scale and growth rate are far from comparable to star products in goods trade.
The deeper problem lies in the industrial foundation: my country’s producer services industry accounts for only 34.4% of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 40% – 50% level of Western developed countries.
Digital trade exports account for slightly more than 50% of service exports, which is also lower than the global average of 56%.
Therefore, from the perspective of trade in services, current policy support is more like “building infrastructure” and “opening up international shipping lanes.”
It is not to cope with the immediate export pressure, but to lay the foundation for the transformation of China’s foreign trade from “cargo-driven” to “dual-wheel driven by goods and services” in the next ten years.
The Ministry of Commerce has made it clear that it will rely on the advantages of “Made in China” to promote the coordinated overseas development of professional services such as finance, law, and consulting.
From the perspective of high-tech manufacturing: the policy is to “attack” and “strengthen”, and the core is to consolidate and expand technological advantages
In addition to the “three new items” and service trade, high-tech manufacturing industries such as electronic information, high-end equipment, and biomedicine constitute the “second echelon” of export growth.
Policies have a different perspective on them: the focus is on consolidating existing advantages and concentrating efforts on conquering the “fortress” of key core technologies.
The policy shows the characteristics of “the central government sets the direction and the local government provides supporting facilities”.
At the national level, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is accelerating the preparation of the “15th Five-Year Plan” for intelligent networked new energy vehicles and other areas, and is implementing a 120% pre-tax super deduction for R&D expenses of industrial machine companies, and is fully promoting the localization of iconic products such as five-axis machine tools.
In the field of biomedicine, eight departments jointly issued a high-quality development plan for the traditional Chinese medicine industry and laid out cutting-edge fields such as biomanufacturing.
Local matching is more precise.
For example:
- Heilongjiang has introduced 17 policies to support the intelligent robot industry. Enterprises can receive up to 15 million yuan in subsidies for R&D investment. The goal is to exceed 10 billion yuan in industry scale by 2028.
- Shandong supports robotics companies to take the lead in implementing 14 major provincial science and technology projects and build 7 provincial key laboratories.
- Hunan, Haikou and other places provide incentives of up to 10 million yuan for the industrialization of innovative biomedical devices.
These “real money” investments quickly transformed into export competitiveness.
January – April 2026:
- Integrated circuit exports increased by 83.7% year-on-year, and the monthly growth rate in April was as high as 99.6%.
- The export value of industrial robots increased by 30%, and the export value of wind turbine sets increased by 40.7%.
- Medical device exports amounted to US$12.585 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.92%.
From this perspective, policies are effectively transforming domestic industrial system advantages and supply chain advantages into export product advantages that are difficult to replace in the international market through technological research and cluster cultivation.
Comprehensive judgment: Differentiation is a mirror of competitiveness, and policy is a “catalyst” rather than a “panacea”
Juxtaposing the above three perspectives, we can draw an integrated conclusion:
- Policy logic varies depending on the industrial stage: the “three new things” have matured, and policies are “weaned” to promote their independence; trade in services is a weak link, and policies are “building foundations” for long-term development; high-tech manufacturing has advantages, and policies are “tackling” to strengthen the core.
This is not blanket support, but refined industry guidance. - The growth rate of exports is not simply proportional to the strength of policies: the fastest growing is high-tech manufacturing (such as integrated circuits + 83.7%) supported by the “tackling” policy, followed by the “three new industries” that are facing “weaning” but are extremely competitive. However, the growth rate of service trade, which is supported by the all-round “foundation-building” policy, is relatively slow (knowledge-intensive service exports + 2.4%).
- The challenges faced are completely different: the challenge of the “new three things” is how to digest rising costs and deal with possible trade frictions; the challenge of service trade is how to quickly make up for weak industrial foundations; the challenge of high-tech manufacturing is how to continue to break through “stuck-up” technologies and maintain a leading position.
Ultimately, the “differentiation trend” of exports itself is a mirror, reflecting the different positions of China’s different industries in the global value chain.
The focus of policy support can be understood as the concentration of resources in those areas that already have or will soon have global competitive advantages.
The goal of this structural change is not to maintain export prosperity in all industries, but to promote the “engine” of China’s foreign trade to shift gears from traditional cost advantages to comprehensive advantages centered on technological innovation and coordination of the entire industry chain.
Future export growth will rely more on “technical hard power” such as integrated circuits and high-end equipment, as well as “service soft power” that will grow as “Made in China” goes overseas.
