According to customs external statistics in May 2026, only 6 tons of domestic gallium metal were sent to Japan that month.
This data has attracted widespread attention. The four-month-long gallium export blank status to Japan has ushered in a slight change. Many overseas media have used this to exaggerate the argument that China-Japan resource trade barriers have been completely lifted. A large number of readers on online platforms have been misled by superficial data and concluded that domestic rare metal export control policies have been significantly loosened.
However, it is difficult for a single export data to completely restore the entire supply chain game. The deep management and control logic and industrial reality need to be comprehensively dismantled in combination with policy provisions and the current status of overseas industries.
In January 2026, the Ministry of Commerce issued regulations on the export control of dual-use critical metals, and three categories of materials: gallium, germanium, and military heavy rare earths were included in the strict approval list.
All foreign trade companies are required to submit complete documents proving the terminal use of materials when applying for export. If the materials prove that the products flow into military-related manufacturing fields, the relevant approval applications will be directly rejected.
At the same time, the resale and reselling of controlled minerals by third parties has been included in the accountability mechanism, and all transfer channels for evading supervision have been blocked.
From January to April, the export value of gallium metal to Japan returned to zero, the export channel of germanium metal continued to be closed, and the rare earth resources supporting the military industry also did not resume normal output.
Most of the world’s primary gallium production capacity is concentrated in domestic areas, and Japan’s domestic semiconductor industry chain production links are highly dependent on this type of rare metal raw materials.
During the four-month period of interruption of raw material supply, the production rhythm of local industries was significantly affected.
Two local companies specializing in electronic specialties announced that in July they had shut down a number of production lines that relied on gallium raw materials. Leading semiconductor companies have simultaneously reduced compound semiconductor production capacity, and the delivery cycle of communications and new energy supporting components continues to lengthen.
Japanese staff used various international exchanges to convey their demands and win over allies from many countries to speak out simultaneously. However, there is no large-scale gallium purification production capacity in overseas countries, and public pressure alone cannot fill the gap in industrial raw materials.
The gallium mining project under construction in Australia cannot be put into production in the short term. It will take several years to build a complete purification production line. There is no stable alternative raw material channel in the short term.
The 6 tons of gallium metal released in May had the characteristics of directional control. The only recipients of domestic gallium export orders that month were Japanese companies. Compared with the market-based multi-regional supply model before the control, there were obvious differences.
The total amount of this batch of raw materials can only support the short-term operation of the local civil industry. The companies have simultaneously signed a material flow supervision agreement, and the customs and commerce departments have tracked the flow of raw materials throughout the process.
If a company illegally transfers raw materials to military production, all subsequent supplies will be subject to permanent restrictions.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the outside world on May 25 and June 9 respectively. The entire set of control measures was implemented based on existing laws and regulations. The original intention of the introduction was to curb Japan’s continued remilitarization trend. There was no unilateral restriction of normal commercial exchanges.
The country has differentiated control standards for different strategic metals. NdFeB permanent magnets have outstanding civilian properties, and exports to Japan increased significantly in May.
Germanium metal has outstanding military-industrial related attributes, and the supply channel remains closed.
The boundaries between military and civilian use of gallium metal are clear, and relevant departments have selectively released a small number of supply quotas.
The adjustment of the pace of material supply is not tied to the bilateral diplomatic atmosphere. Enterprises must strictly abide by safety-related regulations and obtain stable raw material supply channels. If they touch regional security red lines, they will bear the consequences of restricted supply chains.
Six tons of gallium metal can only temporarily alleviate the current shortage of raw materials faced by Japanese companies. The core contradiction of the country’s industry’s dependence on foreign resources has not been resolved.
Online public opinion regards the small amount of supply as a shift in control policy, ignoring the underlying logic of the establishment of the entire control system.
Moderately liberalize some supply chain links and intuitively demonstrate the hard rules of mineral circulation to the global market. The global strategic mineral supply chain maintains a certain order and rules.
